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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.M. BELL, 
Plaint1~tf and Respondent 
vs. 
PARLEY P. JONES, 
Defendant and Appellatnt. 
Respondent's Brief. 
JESSE P. RICH 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
Attor~neys for Plaintiff and Resporndent. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.M. BELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
PARLEY P. JONES, 
Defendant and AppeUamt. 
As stated in appellant's brief, plaintiff started a 
straight suit on a promissory installment note of $850.00 
for the installments then due. It was transferred to 
plaintiff about June 15, 1936 (Ab. 16). Defendant had 
made payments on said note to Alfred J. Bell before it 
was transferred and to this plaintiff after transfer (Pit's. 
Ex. "A", A b. 16). The only objection defendant made to 
the note was that he did not have the money to pay it and 
it was not until the answer was filed to the original com-
plaint that the plaintiff knew that defendant claimed he 
had any defense to said note (A b. 20). The case went 
along for ·some little time and whe:n another installment 
became due, plaintiff filed an amended and supplemental 
complaint demanding payment for the full amount then 
due and alleged that he was a bona fide holder in due 
course. Defendant filed a ~supplemental amswer and a 
second supplemental answer and ·counterclaim. We sub-
mit that the answers tendered by defendant are anything 
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but clear and definite but apparently he endeavored to 
plead failure of consideration estoppel and that the note 
was compromised by a ,scaledown agreement. 
In the District Court the plaintiff ·contended and still 
contends that he is entitled to recover, (1) because he is 
a bona fide holder in due course and, (2) that the s·cale-
down agreement did not cover, nor was it intended to 
cover, the note sued on and there was and is nothing in the 
proceeding in connection with the Federal Land Bank 
loan which would effect the note in question. 
The trial court held against the plaintiff on the first 
proposition, to-wit: that -he was not a bona fide holder in 
due counse, but gave judgment on the theory that the note 
had never been compromised or settled and was not void 
on account of the loan with the Federal Land Bank. The 
plaintiff gave notice of cross-appeal and made cross as-
signments of error from the ruling of the court that the 
plaintiff was not a bona fide holder in due course. 
ARGUMEN'T. 
We maintain that the court erred in holding that the 
plaintiff was not a holder in due ·course. If the plaintiff's 
stand on this question is correct, then the evidence on the 
negotia~ion of the loan with the Federal Land Bank should 
not have been admitted, over our objections, and the court 
should have awarded us judgment on that theory. If this 
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court holds that the trial court was in error in this respect, 
then it should reverse that holding and give us judgment 
on that ground alone. We will therefor, first address our-
selves to that question. 
There is no dispute on the evidence on this question, 
it therefor becomes a question of law. Little vs. Herzinger 
34 Utah 33, 97 Pac. 639. The plaintiff got the note from 
his father about J u.ne 15, 1936. At this time only one in-
stallment was due and that was paid, except $27.63. There 
is no acceleration clause in the note. At that time, Alfred 
J. Bell, the payee and father of plaintiff, was owing plain-
tiff $215.50 (Ab. 8-16) and plaintiff subsequently paid full 
value for the note (Ab. 17-20). After the plaintiff got the 
note, the defendant continued to make payments on the 
same and never at any time questioned its validity until 
action was brought for recovery of the same. 
The theory of the trial ·court seemed to be that inas-
much as the father transferred the note to his son that, 
in the nature of things, the 'SOn could not be a bona fide 
purchaser. Our statute provides that every holder is 
deemed by prima facie to be a holder in due course, Sec. 
61-1-60, Utah Revised Statutes of 1933. 
Section 53 of the same title and chapter defines a 
holder in due course, as follows: 
"A holder in due course is a holder who has 
taken the instrument under the following condi-
tions: 
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(1) That it is ·complete and regular upon its face. 
(2}. That he became the holder of it before it 
wa·s overdue and without notice that it had been 
previously dishonored, if such was the fact. 
(3) That he took it in good faith and for value. 
( 4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he 
had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or 
defect in the title o~ the person negotiating it." 
The plaintiff ·clearly comes within the provisions of 
this statute. 
When a note is transferred to a person on a past due 
debt, that constitutes good consideration for such negotia-
tion and the holder is a holder in due ·course. 
Helper State Bank vs. Jackson et al. 48 Utah 430, 160 
Pac. 287; __ 
Felt vs. Bust, 21 Utah 462, 126 Pac. 88; 
Dern Investment Co. vs. Carbon County Land Co. et 
al, ________ Utah ________ , 75 Pac. 2nd 660. 
There is no question but what this note represents 
the balance due on a land deal and even if Alfred J. Bell 
had told this plaintiff all that he knew about it, that it was 
the balance due on a land deal, which there is no evidence 
to show that he did, yet he still would have been a bona 
fide purcha~ser for value. Sec. 61-1-57 of the Utah Revised 
Statutes of 1933, provides as follows: 
"To constitute notice of an infirmity in the in-
strument, or defect in the title of the person negot-
iating the same, the person to whom it is .negotiated 
mUJSt have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or 
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defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action 
in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." 
Certainly there was no evidence to show lack of good 
faith on the part of plaintiff. 
The only ·case we have been able to find on a father 
and son transaction is the case of Mauat vs. Wells (Minn.) 
79 N. W. 499. In that ca·se a son sold notes fraudulently 
obtained to his father and the court there held that the 
relation of father and son made no difference and that 
the father was a bona fide purchaser. This seems to be 
the only case on the point. See 8 C. J. 520 and 10 C. J. S. 
840. 
There is no evidence whatever of any notice to plain-
tiff of any fraudul~nt transaction, even if the note had 
been included in the ~scaledown agreement. The defend-
ant himself did not know about this until he got word 
from the Federal Land Bank, therefore the plaintiff had 
no way of being put on notice of any defect in title. Hence, 
we submit that plaintiff should .be held to be a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice of defect in title and 
defendant, after making the payments to plaintiff, should 
now be estopped from asserting such a defense. 
If this case had been tried before the jury the court 
should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff on this 
ground alone. 
National Bank of the Republic vs. Beckstead, 68 Utah 
421, 250 Pac. 1033; 
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National Bank of the Republic v-s. Price, 234 Pac. 231, 
65 Utah 57; 
Li,ster vs. Donlan (Mont.) 281 Pac. 348, 72 A. L. R. 1; 
G. F. Jerke vs. Delmont State Bank (S.D.) 223 N. W. 
585, 72 A. L. R. 7. 
As to the other questions, the court fou:nd that at the 
time of signing this scaledown agreement, the defendant 
owed the plaintiff $1250.00 which was the balance due 
him on a !and contract (Ab. 9). This is what Alfred J. 
Bell testified to (A b. 25). The:r:e is substantial evidence 
to uphold this finding and it is a finding of fact which is 
binding upon this court and thi'8 court can no more set 
that finding aside than a verdict of a jury which is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
Smoot vs. Checketts, 41 Ut. 211, 125 Pac. 412. 
Counsel argues that defendant could not have been 
owing the plaintiff that amount. To us, such an argument 
seems useless, in the face of this finding so we will not 
spend further time on it. 
The counsel argues on page 8 of his brief that the 
court gave us a vendor's lien on the property described in 
his counterclaim and in the exhibits which he introduced 
in evidence. We submit there is nothing in the findings 
or the judgment which gives us a vendor's lien. The de-
fendant pleaded that there was no consideration for the 
note and the ·court found that the consideration was the 
balance due on the purchase price of the land which de-
fendant testified he bought from the plaintiff. When the 
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defendant pleaded no consideration, the court by hi·s find-
ing~ merely points out what the consideration of the note 
was. We contend that is only answering the issue raised 
by the defendant. ·The land is des-cribed in defendant's 
supplemental answer and the finding of the court was a 
finding on the issues raised in said final supplemental 
answer, filed by defendant in the District Court, O·ctober 
7,1939 (Judg. Roll page 21-22), (Finding No.5 and 6, Ab. 
8 and 9). However, a judgment should not be reversed 
because the findings go beyond the issues unless the judg-
ment is based thereon. Malmstrom vs. Second East Apart-
ment Co., 7 4 Ut. 206, 278 Pac. 811. 
We submit the only real question before this court, in 
case this co~:U~s~ains the trial court in holding that the 
plaintiff i~'1ioider in due course, is the question of 
whether or not this note was void as against public policy. 
We submit that this issue is really not raised by the plead-
ings, but the defendant pleaded that it was intended to be 
included in the scaledown agreement and compromised 
and settled, so we will now address ourselves to that 
question. 
Counsel argues at some length in his brief that the 
note is void as being against public policy, because it was 
taken as a. side agreement on Federal Land Bank Loan 
after a scaledown agreement had been sig"ned. As stated, 
we don't see where this issue is tendered by the pleadings 
but we will proceed to argue it. 
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The gist of the cases cited by ·counsel is that secret 
side agreements are void when a mortgage is taken out 
with the H. 0. L. C. or the Federal Land Bank unless 
authorized by such ·company on the ground that such side 
agreements are against public policy. However, if ap-
proved by such loan agency, they are legal. The case of 
Bay City Bank vs. White (Mich.) 277 N. W. 888 discusses 
this point anrl holds that where the borrower discloses to 
the loan agency that he is taking other security for the 
balance due him and the loan agency does not object, the 
additional obligation is valid and enforceable. In the case 
of M·cAlister et al. v. Drapeau (Cal.) 92 P. 2d 911, cited by 
counsel, the Supreme Court there recognizes this law and 
tStates that the cases cited by counsel are not inconsistant 
with the Michigan ·case supra. See also Ridge Investment 
Corp. vs. Nicolosi, 193 Atlantic 710, Sirman et al. vs. Sloss 
Realty Co. Inc. (Ark.) 129 S. W. 2nd 602. In the case at 
bar the papers of the Federal Land Bank authorize the 
defendant to have other obligations besides the amount 
represented by the mortgage. 
In the scale down agreement, wherein Alfred J. Bell 
agreed to accept $150.00 for $400.00 due, and by the way 
the only thing which he signed, it states that the condi-
tions of the loan are 
"That applicants tot.al obligations., both secure;d and 
unsecured, shall not exceed t.he amount of $4700.00 when 
s.aid loan is comp-lete-.'' (Def's. ·Ex. 10, A b. 12). 
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The closing instructions of the loan: (Def's. :EJx. "11", 
Ab. 13) contai•ns the following provision which i'S type-
written: 
"This loan is approved on condition that all debts 
both secured and unsecured are scaled down to an 
amount not to exceed $4 700.00." 
and this is followed by a list of payments to be made, 
which payments amount to $3100.00. This provides for a 
Land- Bank loan of $2100.00 and a land commissioners 
loan of $1400.00. This provision authorized the defend-
ant to have both secured and unsec-ured debts. 
Mr. Joseph •H. Watkins, Jr., who is an employee of the 
Cache County Farm Loan Association (Tr. 53) testified 
that these provisions merely meant that Mr. Jones could 
carry obligations in the sum of $1200.00 in excess of the 
loan and which they made and such obligations would still 
be legal. Thus it becomes apparent that in making this 
loan it was contemplated that defendant should have un-
secured obligations, which includes the note in question. 
The defendant applied for $4700.00. If he had got 
it, Alfred J. :Bell would have been paid in full and there 
would have been no necessity for this note. The Land 
Bank refused to make a loan for that amount of money 
but authorized the defendant to obligate himsel~ for it. 
The evidence shows that the total obligations of defendant 
are well within the $4 700.00 limit. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
It was on account of these provisions in the applica-
tion for the mortgage that the trial ·court held the note in 
question a valid obligation and we submit that no other 
holding could rea'Sonably have been made. 
Respectfully 'Submitted, 
JESSE P. RICH 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
Attorme.ys for P'laintitf and Resporndent. 
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